The Competing Objectives Underlying the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage by Yu, Peter K.
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2016
The Competing Objectives Underlying the
Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage
Peter K. Yu
Texas A&M University School of Law, peter_yu@msn.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Cultural Heritage Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation




THE COMPETING OBJECTIVES UNDERLYING 




The protecti on of geneti c resources, traditi onal knowledge (TK) and 
traditi onal cultural expressions (TCE) is of great importance to agricultural 
producti on and food security. As the UK Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR Commission) noted in its fi nal report:
Traditi onal knowledge has played, and sti ll plays, a vital role in the 
daily lives of the vast majority of people. Traditi onal knowledge is 
essenti al to the food security and health of millions of people in the 
developing world. … In additi on, … the use and conti nuous develo-
pment by local farmers of plant varieti es and the sharing and diff u-
sion of these varieti es and the knowledge associated with them play 
an essenti al role in agricultural systems in developing countries. 464
Since its establishment at the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
ti on (WIPO) in September 2000, the Intergovernmental Committ ee on Intel-
lectual Property and Geneti c Resources, Traditi onal Knowledge and Folklore 
(IGC) has worked ti relessly to explore ‘the development of an internati onal 
legal instrument or instruments for the eff ecti ve protecti on of traditi onal cul-
tural expressions and traditi onal knowledge, and to address the intellectual 
property aspects of access to and benefi t-sharing in geneti c resources’.465 As 
the inaugural issue of this Journal goes into producti on, the IGC has made 
important plans to submit the draft  texts of three separate instruments—on 
463 Copyright © 2014 Peter K Yu. This arti cle was abridged and adapted from Peter K Yu, ‘Cultural Relics, 
Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage’ (2008) 81 Temple L Rev 433.
464 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrati ng Intellectual Property Rights and Development 
Policy: Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002) 73.























geneti c resources, TK and TCE—for considerati on by the WIPO General As-
sembly in September 2014.466
In additi on to the IGC’s draft  texts, Switzerland has proposed to amend 
the Regulati ons under the Patent Cooperati on Treaty by explicitly enabling 
nati onal patent legislati on to require the disclosure in patent applicati ons of 
TK and geneti c resources used in patent-seeking inventi ons.467 Although the 
proposal makes the disclosure requirement opti onal, that requirement, once 
implemented, will enable the disclosed informati on to become part of inter-
nati onal patent applicati ons. 468
Within the World Trade Organizati on (WTO), a group of developing 
countries has also advanced a similar proposal, which requires the additi on of 
Arti cle 29bis to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS Agreement).469 If adopted, the new provision would create 
an obligati on to disclose in patent applicati ons the source of origin of biolog-
ical resources and TK used in patent-seeking inventi ons. The proposal would 
further require patent applicants to disclose their compliance with access and 
benefi t-sharing requirements under relevant nati onal laws. Although a large 
number of developing countries have supported the proposal, the United 
States, Japan and South Korea strongly oppose it, claiming that the additi onal 
requirement would destabilize the existi ng patent system.470
In additi on to eff orts at WIPO and the WTO, traditi onal communiti es, 
governments and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizati ons 
have advanced many diff erent proposals and models to protect intangible 
cultural heritage. Among the new internati onal instruments that have been 
adopted outside the intellectual property and internati onal trade regimes 
thus far are the 1992 Conventi on on Biological Diversity (CBD), the 2001 In-
466 Catherine Saez, ‘Protecti on of Folklore Joins TK, GR on Way to WIPO General Assembly’ Intellectual 
Property Watch (7 April 2014) <htt p://www.ip-watch.org/2014/04/07/protecti on-of-folklore-joins-tk-gr-on-
-way-to-wipo-general-assembly/> accessed 4 May 2014.
467 WIPO, Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperati on Treaty, ‘Proposals by Switzer-
land Regarding the Declarati on of the Source of Geneti c Resources and Traditi onal Knowledge 
in Patent Applicati ons’ (PCT/R/WG/5/11 Rev., 2003) 1.
468 Emanuela Arezzo, ‘Struggling around the “Natural” Divide: The Protecti on of Tangible and Intangible 
Indigenous Property’ (2007) 25 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment LJ 367, 381–82.
469 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Council), ‘The Relati onship 
between the TRIPS Agreement and the Conventi on on Biological Diversity: Checklist of Issues’ (IP/C/W/420, 
2004); TRIPS Council, ‘Elements of the Obligati on to Disclose the Source and Country of Origin of the Biolo-
gical Resources and/or Traditi onal Knowledge Used in an Inventi on’ (IP/C/W/429/Rev.1, 2004).
470 Arezzo (n 466 above) 387–88; William New, ‘WTO Biodiversity Amendment Backed; EU Seeks “New 
Thinking” on GIs’ Intellectual Property Watch (26 October 2007) <htt p://www.ip-watch.org/2007/10/26/
wto-biodiversity-amendment-backed-eu-seeks-new-thinking-on-gis/> accessed 4 May 2014.
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ternati onal Treaty on Plant Geneti c Resources for Food and Agriculture (under 
the auspices of the UN Food and Agriculture Organizati on), the 2003 UNESCO 
Conventi on on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, the 2005 UN-
ESCO Conventi on on the Protecti on and Promoti on of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions and the 2007 UN Declarati on on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
Taken together, all of these instruments contribute to the emergent estab-
lishment of a new internati onal framework for the protecti on of intangible 
cultural heritage.
One topic that has received considerable academic and policy att en-
ti on concerns the key objecti ves underlying the establishment of this new 
framework. To help us develop a bett er and deeper understanding, this arti cle 
outlines eight most widely documented objecti ves. While some of these ob-
jecti ves overlap or confl ict with each other, others touch on issues that are of 
only marginal concern to some consti tuencies. By focusing on each objecti ve 
in turn, this arti cle aims to underscore the divergent, and at ti mes competi ng, 
interests among the many stakeholders involved in the framework.
Although some readers may fi nd the descripti on of all eight under-
lying objecti ves somewhat messy, such messiness is rather common in any 
negoti ati ons concerning the establishment of a new internati onal framework. 
Rather than off ering a subjecti ve evaluati on of the importance and urgency of 
each objecti ve, or combining them to deduce some organizing principles, this 
arti cle presents the objecti ves as they appear in the current policy debate. Af-
ter all, policymakers, commentators, acti vists and the public at large are likely 
to value these objecti ves diff erently. By presenti ng the objecti ves together, 
this arti cle foreshadows the challenges to achieving internati onal consensus 
on the protecti on of intangible cultural heritage.
It is worth noti ng that this arti cle does not disti nguish between TK and 
TCE, even though the former is arguably more important and relevant to agri-
cultural producti on and food security. There are at least two reasons. First, in-
digenous peoples and traditi onal communiti es embrace a holisti c worldview. 
They do not make clear disti ncti ons between TK and TCE, and they ‘regard 
expressions of their traditi onal cultures/folklore as inseparable from systems 
of traditi onal knowledge’. 471 Second, because the discussions of TK and TCE 
are somewhat intertwined, a comprehensive discussion will be needed to fully 
understand the competi ng objecti ves underlying the protecti on of intangible 
cultural heritage.
























While globalizati on, the digital revoluti on and the increasing commod-
ifi cati on of informati on have enriched the lives of many traditi onal communi-
ti es, these factors have equally threatened these communiti es by allowing for 
the instantaneous distributi on of knowledge and materials that are sacred or 
intended to be kept secret. 472 As Angela Riley noted, such unauthorized re-
producti on and distributi on remains ‘one of the biggest problems faced by 
indigenous groups today’.473
From the standpoint of traditi onal communiti es, secrecy is important 
for both cultural and spiritual purposes. As Tom Greaves explained:
[T]he control of traditi onal ideas and knowledge … identi fi es places, 
customs and beliefs which, if publicly known, will destroy parts of 
a people’s cultural identi ty. Someti mes it is knowledge entrusted 
only to properly prepared religious specialists. Disclosure to other, 
unqualifi ed members destroys it. Someti mes it is knowledge sha-
red among all of a society’s members, but not with outsiders. Such 
knowledge charters a society’s sense of self; to disclose it loosens 
the society’s self-rati onale. 474
The ability for these peoples to keep ideas and knowledge secret is 
therefore very important. As Sarah Harding explained, ‘secrecy is an integral 
part of the sacredness of certain objects, stories, songs or rituals, and as such, 
instrumental in maintaining a certain social structure within the cultural group. 
[It] helps protect rituals and customs from destructi ve external forces.’ 475
Although traditi onal communiti es underscore the importance of pro-
tecti ng sacred objects and expressions, it has not been easy to disti nguish 
between what is sacred and what is not. Making such a disti ncti on someti mes 
may even be impossible, given the communiti es’ holisti c worldview and lack 
of disti ncti on between sacredness and secularity. As the late Darrell Posey 
explained:
472 Angela R Riley, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Promise of Globalizati on: An Essay on Rights and Respon-
sibiliti es’ (2004) 14 Kansas J L & Public Policy 155, 159.
473 ibid 157.
474 Tom Greaves, ‘IPR: A Current Survey’ in Tom Greaves (ed), Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous 
Peoples: A Sourcebook (Society for Applied Anthropology 1994) 4.
475 Sarah Harding, ‘Value, Obligati on and Cultural Heritage’ (1999) 31 Arizona State LJ 291, 314.
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All creati on is sacred, and the sacred and secular are inseparable. 
Spirituality is the highest form of consciousness, and spiritual cons-
ciousness is the highest form of awareness. In this sense a dimen-
sion of traditi onal knowledge is not local knowledge but knowledge 
of the universal as expressed in the local. In indigenous and local 
cultures, experts exist who are peculiarly aware of the organizing 
principles of nature, someti mes described as enti ti es, spirits, or na-
tural law. Thus, knowledge of the environment depends not only 
on the relati onship between humans and nature but also betwe-
en the visible world and the invisible spirit world. According to the 
Ghanaian writer Kofi  Asare Opoku, the disti ncti ve feature of tradi-
ti onal African religion is that it is ‘A way of life, [with] the purpose 
of … ordering our relati onship with our fellow men and with our 
environment, both spiritual and physical. At the root of it is a quest 
for harmony between man, the spirit world, nature, and society.’ 
The unseen is, therefore, as much a part of reality as that which is 
seen—the spiritual is as much a part of reality as the material. In 
fact, there is a complementary relati onship between the two, with 
the spiritual being more powerful than the material. 476
Even if the materials are not sacred or intended to be kept secret, 
it is important that the materials are not used in a way that would off end 
traditi onal communiti es—as in OutKast’s culturally insensiti ve performance of 
their hit ‘Hey Ya’ during the internati onally televised 2004 Grammy Awards 
Ceremony477 and the University of Illinois’ use of its fi cti ti ous Indian mascot 
Chief Illiniwek for more than eight decades.478
Moreover, regardless of whether the communiti es fi nd the use of 
these materials off ensive, they may prefer to keep their ideas and knowledge 
out of commercial channels. As Erica-Irene Daes, the founding chairperson 
and Special Rapporteur of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populati ons, 
noted, ‘In many ways, indigenous peoples challenge the fundamental assump-
ti ons of globalizati on. They do not accept the assumpti on that humanity will 
benefi t from the constructi on of a world culture of consumerism.’479 Indeed, 
476 Darrell Addison Posey, ‘Selling Grandma: Commodifi cati on of the Sacred through Intellectual Property 
Rights’ in Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush (eds), Claiming the Stones/Naming the Bones: Cultural Property 
and the Negoti ati on of Nati onal and Ethnic Identi ty (Gett y Research Insti tute 2002) 201.
477 Eireann Brooks, ‘Cultural Imperialism vs. Cultural Protecti onism: Hollywood’s Response to UNESCO 
Eff orts to Promote Cultural Diversity’ (2006) 5 J Intl Business & L 112, 117–18; Angela R Riley, ‘“Straight 
Stealing”: Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protecti on’ (2005) 80 Washington L Rev 69, 
70–72.
478 Jodi S Cohen, ‘Hail to the Chief—and Farewell’ Chicago Tribune (22 February 2007) C1; Jon Saraceno, 
‘Illini’s Chief’s Final Dance Here at Last’ USA Today (21 February 2007) 2C.
























consumerism may have litt le meaning to these communiti es. As she wrote 
earlier in her report for the Working Group:
Possessing a song, story or medicinal knowledge carries with it cer-
tain responsibiliti es to show respect to and maintain a reciprocal 
relati onship with the human beings, animals, plants and places with 
which the song, story or medicine is connected. For indigenous pe-
oples, heritage is a bundle of relati onships, rather than a bundle 
of economic rights. The ‘object’ has no meaning outside of the re-
lati onship, whether it is a physical object such as a sacred site or 
ceremonial tool, or an intangible such as a song or story. To sell it is 
necessarily to bring the relati onship to an end. 480
Traditi onal communiti es may also ‘fear for the well-being of [their 
communiti es] in the face of commercial exploitati on, and … worry that the 
expropriati on of their living culture will cause their imagery to lose its origi-
nal signifi cance which will lead to a disrupti on of their practi ced religion and 
beliefs and a dissoluti on of their culture’. 481 Indeed, as Susan Scafi di pointed 
out, ‘A cultural product reduced to the state of a mere commodity by the 
destructi on of its intangible value is unlikely to be restored to the source com-
munity.’ 482
Thus, it is understandable why commentators have been concerned 
about the conti nuous push for intellectual property rights to protect TK and 
TCE. Aft er all, the intellectual property system ‘was largely developed in the 
West, and its models are based on a capitalisti c philosophy designed to serve 
a market economy’, which is quite diff erent from philosophies embraced by 
traditi onal communiti es.483 It is therefore no surprise that Naomi Roht-Arriaza 
expressed concern that, ‘by att empti ng to manipulate the prevailing Western 
paradigm to suit their needs, … indigenous peoples [will] accelerate the very 
commodifi cati on of knowledge and of living things that many fi nd so objec-
ti onable’484
Concerns about the potenti al loss of heritage also explain why tra-
diti onal communiti es are generally scepti cal of open access arrangements, 
480 Erica-Irene Daes, ‘Discriminati on against Indigenous Peoples: Study on the Protecti on of the Cultural 
and Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples’ (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28, 1993) [26].
481 Christi ne Haight Farley, ‘Protecti ng Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the 
Answer?’ (1997) 30 Connecti cut L Rev 1, 15.
482 Susan Scafi di, Who Owns Culture?: Appropriati on and Authenti city in American Law (Rutgers UP 
2005) 104.
483 Riley (n 470 above) 159.
484 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriati on of the Scienti fi c and Technical Know-
ledge of Indigenous and Local Communiti es’ (1996) 17 Michigan J Intl L 919, 956.
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such as those relying on the development of a commons. As Michael Brown 
pointed out, ‘from the indigenous-rights perspecti ve, the public domain is the 
problem, not the soluti on, because it defi nes traditi onal knowledge as a freely 
available resource’. 485 In fact, the existi ng push for open access arrangements 
oft en ignores the inequitable conditi ons and distributi on problems in the cur-
rent socioeconomic system. Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder also cau-
ti oned that ‘free and open access had the tendency to suggest “a commons 
where resources are up for grabs by the most technologically advanced”’.486 
Because one’s success in the commons depends on factors like knowledge, 
wealth, power, access and ability, an open access approach does not benefi t 
everybody equally.487 Such an approach may therefore be of limited assistance 
to the poor, the backward, the needy and the politi cally marginalized.
To complicate matt ers even further, ‘there may not always be con-
sensus within a community … as to what is or is not acceptable use of cultur-
ally signifi cant images in works intended for commercial sale’. 488 While some 
members of the communiti es may object to any usage for commercial pur-
poses, others would allow the use of some materials at selected ti mes under 
certain conditi ons. Thus, it is important to let the communiti es determine for 
themselves what materials can be used for commercial purposes. In doing so, 
the communiti es could ‘make careful determinati ons about which events [or 
objects] are appropriate for outsiders based on norms of tribal law, allowing 
such revenue-generati ng acti viti es only when they will not infringe on cultural 
privacy or religious dictates’. 489
In recent years, cultural group leaders, policymakers and commenta-
tors have called for greater protecti on of ‘cultural privacy’—that is, ‘the right 
of possessors of a culture—especially possessors of a nati ve culture—to shield 
themselves from unwanted scruti ny’.490 Arti cle 12(1) of the Declarati on on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for instance, sti pulates:
485 Michael F Brown, Who Owns Nati ve Culture? (Harvard UP 2003) 237.
486 Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, ‘The Romance of the Public Domain’ (2004) 92 California L Rev 
1331, 1356 fn. 131.
487 ibid 1332.
488 Wayne Shinya, Protecti ng Traditi onal Cultural Expressions: Policy Issues and Considerati ons from a 
Copyright Perspecti ve (Department of Canadian Heritage 2004) 35.
489 Kristen A Carpenter, Sonia K Katyal and Angela R Riley, ‘In Defense of Property’ (2009) 118 Yale LJ 1022, 
1084.























Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practi se, develop 
and teach their spiritual and religious traditi ons, customs and cere-
monies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to 
their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of 
their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriati on of their 
human remains.
Likewise, Professor Brown reminded us that ‘[a] right to cultural pri-
vacy is presented as self-evident and morally unassailable, even if its scope 
remains unspecifi ed’.491
AUTHENTICITY
The second objecti ve concerns the authenti city of the protected ma-
terials. If the contributi ons of traditi onal communiti es are to be recognized, 
these materials need to be authenti c. Unfortunately, as shown in many repro-
ducti ons of Maya steles, Aboriginal craft s and Nati ve American rugs, nontra-
diti onal producers and copycats usually have very limited understanding of 
the culture that the works embody. In the end, they produce materials that 
not only free-ride on the eff orts and contributi ons of traditi onal communiti es, 
but fail to make sense to those communiti es or researchers who study their 
culture.
For example, ‘Aboriginal Australian arti sts, writers and actors com-
plained that non-Aboriginals were taking the initi ati ve in uti lizing Aboriginal 
moti fs and themes, oft en resulti ng in misinterpretati ons and negati ve stereo-
types’.492 They have also been concerned about ‘the uti lisati on of reproduc-
ti ons of traditi onal Aboriginal designs as a means of decorati ng a host of mun-
dane products primarily developed for the tourist trade, such as tea-towels, 
pencil cases, key rings, tee-shirts[,] … drink coasters[,] … wall hangings, carpets 
and posters’. 493 Furthermore, ‘in Peru, local workers manufacture and sell rep-
licas of golden arti facts symbolizing Incan culture with no remembrance or 
connecti on to the heritage that created such arti facts’.494 Most disturbing of 
all, some ‘ingenious people set up a town named “Zuni” in the Philippines, 
then stamped goods with the label “Made in Zuni”’. 495
491 ibid 28.
492 Daes (n 478 above) [68].
493 Michael Blakeney, ‘Protecti ng Expressions of Australian Aboriginal Folklore under Copyright Law’ 
(1995) 17 EIPR 442, 442.
494 Doris Estelle Long, ‘The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Property 
Perspecti ve’ (1998) 23 North Carolina J Intl L & Commercial Regulati on 229, 243.
495 J Michael Finger, ‘Introducti on and Overview’ in J Michael Finger and Philip Schuler (eds), Poor Peo-
ple’s Knowledge: Promoti ng Intellectual Property in Developing Countries (OUP 2004) 17.
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While traditi onal communiti es have sought courts’ assistance in en-
joining others from making unauthorized reproducti on of their materials, their 
cease-and-desist demands are not always fruitf ul. For instance, in the case of 
the Australian aborigines, ‘aft er Australian tee-shirt companies were sued for 
infringing the copyright of Aboriginal arti sts, they began to print shirts with 
fake designs. “Most tourists shops [therefore] … are replete with examples of 
T-shirt designs which may appear to be works of Aboriginal art but are in fact 
caricatures of Aboriginal art.”’496 The resulti ng misrepresentati on and distor-
ti on have caused signifi cant economic and psychological injuries to traditi on-
al communiti es. As Michael Blakeney noted, ‘the unauthorised reproducti on 
of designs which are of signifi cance to Aboriginal religious beliefs and cultur-
al identi ty is as damaging as the desecrati on, through mining, of traditi onal 
dreaming places’.497
To reduce abuse and unauthorized copying, trademarks—in parti cular, 
certi fi cati on marks—have been used to ensure the authenti city and appropri-
ate use of traditi onal materials. 498 Moral rights provide additi onal protecti on 
against ‘debasement, muti lati on or destructi on’ of traditi onal expressions.499 
Because ‘the absence of an authenti city mark [or proper att ributi on] would 
alert potenti al consumers of cultural products to a lack of associati on with the 
presumed source community’,500 these diff erent forms of rights may enable 
traditi onal communiti es to share in the benefi ts of their intangible cultural 
heritage and obtain appropriate recogniti on for their creati ve contributi ons.
Although expectati ons for authenti city usually result in greater con-
trol by traditi onal communiti es and more deference to them, such expecta-
ti ons someti mes may backfi re on the communiti es by making it more diffi  cult 
496 Brown 2(n Concerns about the potenti al loss of heritage also explain why traditi onal communiti es are 
generally scepti cal of open access arrangements, such as those relying on the development of a commons. 
As Michael Brown pointed out, ‘from the indigenous-rights perspecti ve, the public domain is the problem, 
not the soluti on, because it defi nes traditi onal knowledge as a freely available resource’. In fact, the existi ng 
push for open access arrangements oft en ignores the inequitable conditi ons and distributi on problems in 
the current socioeconomic system. Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder also cauti oned that ‘free and 
open access had the tendency to suggest “a commons where resources are up for grabs by the most tech-
nologically advanced”’. Because one’s success in the commons depends on factors like knowledge, wealth, 
power, access and ability, an open access approach does not benefi t everybody equally. Such an approach 
may therefore be of limited assistance to the poor, the backward, the needy and the politi cally marginali-
zed. above) 89.
497 Blakeney (n 491 above) 442.
498 Maui Solomon, ‘Protecti ng Maori Heritage in New Zealand’ in Hoff man (above) 355; Wend B Wen-
dland, ‘Intellectual Property and the Protecti on of Traditi onal Knowledge and Cultural Expressions’ in Bar-
bara T Hoff man (ed), Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practi ce (CUP 2006) 333.
499 Kamal Puri, ‘Cultural Ownership and Intellectual Property Rights Post-Mabo: Putti  ng Ideas into Acti on’ 
(1995) 9 Intellectual Property J 293, 332.























for them to demand the return of those cultural arti facts that are already 
taken from the communiti es without their authorizati on. For example, a mu-
seum can use authenti city as a justi fi cati on to reject demands by indigenous 
communiti es to rebury human remains residing in the museum. 501
RECOGNITION
An objecti ve that goes hand in hand with the protecti on of authen-
ti city interests is the recogniti on of the contributi ons traditi onal communiti es 
have made over the centuries. Such recogniti on can be achieved through the 
introducti on of greater control of their intangible cultural heritage, which in 
turn would enable the communiti es to share in the benefi ts of the exploita-
ti on of such heritage. The traditi onal communiti es’ intangible cultural heritage 
can also be recognized through a requirement to disclose the origins of the 
traditi onal materials used in new creati ons or inventi ons. Proposals that seek 
to introduce a disclosure requirement include Switzerland’s recent proposal 
to amend the Patent Cooperati on Treaty Regulati ons and a similar proposal 
by a group of developing countries to amend the TRIPS Agreement. To some 
extent, these requirements resemble those ethical guidelines museums have 
used to ensure the proper handling of cultural arti facts.502
By identi fying the source of the underlying materials, a disclosure 
requirement would help users bett er understand the origin of the products 
while providing recogniti on to the community responsible for the creati on of 
those materials. Such a requirement would also enhance the ability of ‘pro-
viders of geneti c resources and TK to keep track of the use of their tangible 
and intangible resources as well as the development resulti ng in patentable 
inventi ons’.503
If informed consent is further mandated as part of the requirement, 
like what is stated in the Arti cle 29bis Proposal, the requirement would fur-
ther ensure a legiti mate exchange between traditi onal communiti es and fol-
low-on authors or inventors. Such consent is parti cularly important when the 
inventi on includes geneti c resources from indigenous peoples and traditi onal 
communiti es. Such a requirement would also ‘increase transparency and help 
Developing Countries to monitor actual compliance with the provisions [on 
501 Patt y Gerstenblith, ‘Cultural Signifi cance and the Kennewick Skeleton: Some Thoughts on the Resolu-
ti on of Cultural Heritage Disputes’ in Barkan and Bush (n 474 above) 163.
502 James AR Nafziger, ‘The Principles for Cooperati on in the Mutual Protecti on and Transfer of Cultural 
Material’ (2007) 8 Chicago J Intl L 147, 151–52.
503 Arezzo (n 466 above) 381.
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access and benefi t sharing] set forth in the CBD’.504
Moreover, the disclosure requirement would benefi t the public at 
large by informing the public of the origin of the underlying materials while at 
the same ti me allowing them to anti cipate potenti al issues that may arise as 
a result of such usage. By disclosing in intellectual property applicati ons the 
underlying prior art, the requirement would also reduce the chance of privat-
izati on of pre-existi ng TK and geneti c resources, both of which will remain in 
the public domain and be freely available to the public at large.
The requirement would also help strike a practi cal compromise that 
would allow traditi onal communiti es to ensure authenti city, obtain recogni-
ti on and share in the benefi ts amidst the rapid commodifi cati on of TCE and 
conti nuous and expanding practi ce of bioprospecti ng. As Christi ne Haight Far-
ley wrote:
Assuming that the circulati on of indigenous art is inevitable, some 
indigenous arti sts want to be sure to parti cipate in this celebrati on 
of indigenous culture. By gaining control over the circulati on of 
their imagery, they want to ensure that the public gets an accurate 
account of indigenous culture and that the investment in that cultu-
re goes back to their communiti es.505
Nevertheless, disclosure has a major weakness: because of the inher-
ent diffi  culty in determining the source of origin of the underlying materials, 
such a requirement may lead to uncertainty and inconsistency and may ul-
ti mately reduce incenti ves for creati on and innovati on. As Emanuela Arezzo 
explained:
Use of geneti c resources is rarely recognizable by merely looking 
at the fi nal product. Even under a close analysis, indigenous people 
would not know that biological resources had been taken without 
prior informed consent, not to menti on access and benefi t sharing; 
the same applies for TK. Only when the innovati on consists of the 
very same use of the plant that is known in the indigenous commu-
nity is the link between the biological resource and the patent 
apparent. Someti mes, however, traditi onal scienti fi c knowledge 
only provides useful leads that ‘bioprospectors’ use for prioriti zing 
the screening of certain plants. The isolated molecules and com-
pounds of these plants may reveal properti es beyond those iden-
ti fi ed by indigenous communiti es, or the properti es already known 
by indigenous communiti es are studied for new purposes. In the 
latt er case, the link between TK and the fi nal product gets blurred 
504 ibid 379.























along the way to the patent offi  ce, and indigenous people are unab-
le to fi nd out about—and hence oppose—biosquatti  ng.506
This diffi  culty is, indeed, one of the main reasons why the United 
States and Japan has strongly opposed the disclosure requirement proposals 
at both WIPO and the WTO.507 Whether the requirement will be benefi cial 
will depend on whether the benefi ts of disclosure exceed its costs. At this 
point, making that determinati on will require further empirical research.
Compensati on
In additi on to recogniti on and authenti city, some traditi onal commu-
niti es want compensati on. As this arti cle has shown earlier, the use of tradi-
ti onal materials without their authorizati on harms the communiti es in eco-
nomic, social, cultural, psychological and spiritual terms. As a result, some 
communiti es have demanded compensati on for their injuries. Although such 
compensati on may not fully cover those injuries, it does provide signifi cant 
benefi ts to traditi onal communiti es. At the very least, it can promote ‘local 
sustenance and adequacy for living’ for these communiti es.508
As Graham Dutf ield reminded us, ‘TK is valuable fi rst and foremost 
to indigenous and local communiti es who depend upon it for their livelihoods 
and well-being, as well as for enabling them to sustainably manage and exploit 
their local ecosystems such as through sustainable low-input agriculture.’ 509 
Likewise, Professor Brown suggested that we should reframe the questi on 
from ‘Who owns nati ve culture?’ to ‘How can we promote respectf ul treat-
ment of nati ve cultures and indigenous forms of self-expression within mass 
societi es?’510
Taking account of the growing demands, Jerome Reichman advanced 
a proposal for using liability rules to address problems concerning the protec-
ti on of TK and subpatentable inventi ons.511 Under his proposed compensatory 
liability regime, second comers will be required ‘to pay equitable compensa-
506 Arezzo (n 466 above) 379.
507 ibid 387–88.
508 Stephen Gudeman, ‘Sketches, Qualms, and Other Thoughts on Intellectual Property Rights’ in Ste-
phen B Brush and Doreen Stabinsky (eds), Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous People and Intellectual 
Property Rights (Island Press 1996) 119.
509 Graham Dutf ield, ‘Legal and Economic Aspects of Traditi onal Knowledge’ in Keith E Maskus and Jero-
me H Reichman (eds), Internati onal Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual 
Property Regime (CUP 2005) 505.
510 Brown (n 483 above) 10.
511 JH Reichman, ‘Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovati on’ 
(2000) 53 Vanderbilt L Rev 1743, 1776–91.
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ti on for borrowed improvements over a relati vely short period of ti me’.512 As 
Professor Reichman explained, such an alternati ve regime has several bene-
fi ts. For example, it ‘could sti mulate investment without chilling follow-on in-
novati on and without creati ng legal barriers to entry’.513 Such a regime ‘would 
also go a long way toward answering hard questi ons about how to protect 
applicati ons of traditi onal biological and cultural knowledge to industry, ques-
ti ons that are of increasing importance to developing and least-developed 
countries’.514
A few years later, Professor Reichman and his colleague, Tracy Lewis, 
built on this proposal and called for the use of liability rules to address prob-
lems concerning TK protecti on.515 Their compensatory liability regime would 
provide traditi onal communiti es with ‘a clear enti tlement to prevent whole-
sale duplicati on of their compiled informati on and to reasonable compensa-
ti on for all follow-on commercial applicati ons of their traditi onal knowledge 
during a specifi ed period of ti me’.516 The regime provides three disti nct rights: 
‘[1] a right to prevent wholesale duplicati on, [2] a right to compensati on from 
value-adding improvers and [3] a right to make use of a second comer’s val-
ue-adding improvements for purposes of making further improvements of his 
or her own’.517 Through protecti on of these rights, the regime ‘would tempo-
rarily remove eligible traditi onal knowledge from the limbo of a true public 
domain and relocate it to a semicommons, from which it could freely be ac-
cessed and used for specifi ed purposes, in return for the payment of compen-
satory royalti es for a specifi ed period of ti me’.518
Notwithstanding these proposals, and similar proposals by other pol-
icymakers and commentators, compensati on can be diffi  cult someti mes. For 
instance, as the previous secti on noted, detecti ng the use of geneti c resources 
can be diffi  cult, ti me consuming and technology intensive.519 Researchers may 
also ‘fi nd that a bioacti ve ingredient has a medical use diff erent from that 
suggested by the original collectors’; such varied use ‘is by no means unusual 
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a society’s own understanding and yet fail to sati sfy the effi  cacy standards of 
Western medicine’.520
Moreover, some communiti es would simply consider monetary com-
pensati on inadequate. The conti nuing of cultural knowledge and practi ces is 
important to the survival of the communiti es,521 and it is hard to quanti fy 
cultural erosion and community loss in monetary terms. As Antony Taubman, 
the director of the WTO Intellectual Property Division and the former director 
of WIPO Global Intellectual Property Issues Division, pointed out, ‘Where cer-
tain uses cause spiritual off ence and threaten cultural integrity, … rather than 
commercial damage, monetary payment may not be viewed by TK holders 
as … an equitable form of compensati on.’ 522 Meanwhile, the survival of the 
community is also important to the survival of culture and knowledge.523 If 
the community disappears, such important knowledge is also likely to become 
exti nct.
BENEFIT SHARING
A more conciliatory objecti ve is to allow traditi onal communiti es 
and developing countries to share in the benefi ts created through the use of 
their intangible cultural heritage. Arti cle 8(j) of the CBD, for example, requires 
member states to
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovati ons and prac-
ti ces of indigenous and local communiti es embodying traditi onal 
lifestyles relevant for the conservati on and sustainable use of 
biological diversity and promote their wider applicati on with the 
approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, inno-
vati ons and practi ces and encourage the equitable sharing of the 
benefi ts arising from the uti lizati on of such knowledge, innovati ons 
and practi ces.
The Arti cle 29bis Proposal also requires the disclosure of informati on 
concerning the compliance with the CBD’s benefi t-sharing requirement.
Taken together, these benefi t-sharing arrangements would allow tra-
diti onal communiti es to capitalize on what Michael Finger and Philip Schuler 
have called ‘poor people’s knowledge’.524 As noted in a study by the Depart-
ment of Canadian Heritage, the protecti on of TK and TCE can be seen ‘as part 
520 Brown (n 483 above) 111.
521 Daes (n 478 above) [30].
522 Antony Taubman, ‘Saving the Village: Conserving Jurisprudenti al Diversity in the Internati onal Protec-
ti on of Traditi onal Knowledge’ in Maskus and Reichman (n 507 above) 532.
523 WIPO, Intellectual Property and Traditi onal Knowledge (2005) 7.
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of a development strategy’.525 By facilitati ng the use and further development 
of this knowledge and these expressions, the arrangements would also benefi t 
nontraditi onal communiti es and the public at large, especially if the protected 
materials can be clearly identi fi ed and such protecti on would not incur signifi -
cant transacti on costs or result in what Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg 
described as the ‘tragedy of the anti -commons’.526
To maximize benefi ts from the arrangement, commentators have ad-
vocated the use of property or intellectual property rights. By creati ng ar-
ti fi cial scarcity in the form of limited monopolies, similar to what is off ered 
in the intellectual property system, the exclusive rights model would enable 
traditi onal communiti es to obtain a higher return on the use and exploitati on 
of their cultural materials. As Professor Daes reasoned:
A number of disti ncti vely patt erned texti les, such as ikat cloth 
from Sulawesi and Zapotec rugs from Mexico have obtained large 
markets in industrialized countries. These items can easily be re-
produced at lower cost on machines, however, and when produced 
in large quanti ti es they quickly lose their novelty and commercial 
value.527
Notwithstanding these benefi ts, commentators have questi oned 
whether such a model would be ideal for the protecti on of intangible cultural 
heritage. For instance, ‘indigenous peoples do not view their heritage in terms 
of property at all … but in terms of community and individual responsibility.… 
For indigenous peoples, heritage is a bundle of relati onships, rather than a 
bundle of economic rights.’528 Moreover, as Naomi Mezey noted:
Cultural property is contradictory in the very pairing of its core 
concepts. Property is fi xed, possessed, controlled by its owner, and 
alienable. Culture is none of these things. Thus, cultural property 
claims tend to fi x culture, which if anything is unfi xed, dynamic, and 
unstable. They also tend to saniti ze culture, which if it is anything 
is human and messy, and therefore as ugly as it is beauti ful, as des-
tructi ve as it is creati ve, as off ensive as it is inspiring. 529
There is also a general ‘presumpti on that Western nati ons prefer 
private ownership and source nati ons or indigenous peoples prefer group or 
525 Shinya (n 486 above) 24.
526 Michael Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovati on, 
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common ownership’.530 However, it is important to remember that not all tra-
diti onal objects are intended to be communal. As Professor Daes pointed out, 
‘although heritage is communal, there is usually an individual who can best 
be described as a custodian or caretaker of each song, story, name, medicine, 
sacred place and other aspect of a people’s heritage’.531 Moreover, as Michael 
Harkin has shown, the ‘masks and ceremonial objects of the Kwakiutl, items 
associated with the potlatch ritual, were not communal but intensely perso-
nal, having been created for, and owned by, specifi c individuals’. 532 Many of the 
songs and dances associated with this potlatch ritual, indeed, ‘are under the 
exclusive possession and control of parti cular individuals’.533 Exclusive posses-
sion and control can also be found in ‘some of the songs of the Suya, or the 
sacred objects of the Australian Aboriginal people’.534
More recently, Kristen Carpenter, Sonia Katyal and Angela Riley made 
a very convincing case about the merits of the property model.535 As they ex-
plained, it is not that model per se that creates problems for the protecti on of 
intangible cultural heritage, but rather the undue focus on ownership and the 
rights to exclude, develop and transfer that makes the model undesirable.536 
To remedy this misguided focus, they arti culated a new property model that 
is based on a stewardship paradigm. As they explained, such a model would 
‘take[] into account indigenous peoples’ collecti ve obligati ons toward land 
and resources’.537
Their proposed model makes a lot of sense. Stewardship has long 
been used as a key justi fi cati on for the protecti on of intangible cultural heri-
tage. In additi on, the property model based on a stewardship paradigm would 
not necessarily result in exclusion, alienati on and transfer—some of the main 
concerns of traditi onal communiti es. Nevertheless, even if we embrace this 
paradigm, there may sti ll be questi ons concerning how broadly stewardship 
should be defi ned. As Barry Barclay noted:
Each generati on has a part in … stewardship. Having taken a story-
teller positi on, I could show a great range of people who are in-
530 Harding (n 473 above) 304.
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volved in this stewardship, from the home gardener, the peasant 
farmer and the traditi onal plant breeder to the internati onal policy 
maker; anybody, in fact, who is involved in the stewardship of the 
plants humans depend upon for life itself. For my money, that invol-
ves, to a greater or lesser extent, each one of us. But while the term 
‘stewardship’ provides a useful context within which to place this or 
that aspect of our management responsibiliti es, it does not formally 
front up on the tough questi on: who owns the seed? ‘A private or 
public resource?’ Pat Mooney asks.538
In additi on to the use of property rights, benefi t sharing can be ar-
ranged through the use of knowledge transfer and research collaborati ve 
agreements. 539 The innovati ve approach taken by the Insti tuto Nacional de 
Biodiversidad (INBio) in Costa Rica provided a leading example of the success-
ful use of these agreements. The agreements allowed companies like Merck 
to collect biological samples in conservatories set up in Costa Rica and con-
duct research and develop commercial products based on those samples in 
exchange for advance payment and royalti es in those products.540 As one 
commentator observed, since its establishment, INBio ‘has signed more than 
20 agreements with industry, … and the total of the research budgets have 
come to represent an investment of US$0.5 million per year for bioprospect-
ing acti viti es and US$0.5 million per year for capacity building, technology 
transfer and insti tuti onal empowerment’.541 Although INBio was widely cited 
as a success a decade ago, recent reports have noted the insti tute’s deep fi -
nancial crisis.542 It remains to be seen whether this crisis was caused by the 
bioprospecti ng arrangement or other unrelated factors.
In sum, a number of ways exists to allow traditi onal communiti es to 
share in the benefi ts of the exploitati on of their intangible cultural heritage. 
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Two problems remain, however. First, the establishment of benefi t-sharing 
arrangements assumes that traditi onal materials can be freely commodifi ed. 
This is not true with respect to materials that are sacred or intended to be 
kept secret. Second, and more importantly, there is no guarantee that the 
proceeds from the benefi t-sharing arrangement will go directly to traditi onal 
communiti es. Many developing countries remain troubled by rampant cor-
rupti on and inadequate infrastructure. 543 As a result, the revenues that are 
generated through the use of intangible cultural heritage may never reach the 
hands of traditi onal communiti es.
Indeed, commentators have been parti cularly concerned about the 
potenti al claims on revenues by mediati ng government agencies. As Tom Gre-
aves wrote, ‘all of the countries with signifi cant indigenous societi es have go-
vernment mediator agencies to deal with them [and serve as the authorized 
guardians of their welfare].… Would [the earned revenues] by-pass these in-
termediate organizati ons?’544 Likewise, Professor Brown questi oned, ‘Who are 
legiti mate representati ves of indigenous peoples in negoti ati ons with foreign 
bioprospectors? Can the state speak for them, or must they be allowed to 
speak for themselves?’545 To avoid diversion, some companies, like Shaman 
Pharmaceuti cals, have chosen ‘not … to return royalti es directly to source 
communiti es but to a Northern-run NGO that will distribute the proceeds as 
it sees fi t’.546
To make things even gloomier and more complicated, there is a his-
torical lack of respect and representati on for, and parti cipati on of, traditi onal 
communiti es in the politi cal process.547 This is true with respect to commu-
niti es in both the developed and developing worlds. As Rosemary Coombe 
noted:
Although indigenous peoples are now recognized as key actors in 
this global dialogue, it will need to be expanded to encompass a 
wider range of principles and prioriti es, which will eventually en-
compass politi cal commitments to indigenous peoples’ rights of 
self-determinati on. Only when indigenous peoples are full partners 
in this dialogue, with full juridical standing and only when … their 
cultural world views, customary laws, and ecological practi ces are 
recognized as fundamental contributi ons to resolving local social 
justi ce concerns will we be engaged in anything we can genuinely 
543 Paul J Heald, ‘The Rhetoric of Biopiracy’ (2003) 11 Cardozo J Intl & Comparati ve L 519, 536.
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The late Keith Aoki also reminded us that it is not diffi  cult to ‘imagine 
situati ons where the interests of subnati onal groups, communiti es or tribes 
are at loggerheads with state interests’. 549
Notwithstanding these politi cal challenges, it is important not to 
overstate the disconnect between nati onal governments and traditi onal 
communiti es. As Paul Kuruk observed:
Most Africans belong to tribes and have roots in traditi onal commu-
niti es, whether they live in villages or citi es. The lowest rural 
shepherd boy is no more a traditi onalist than is the President of the 
country living in the state capital. Also, tribal groups are as much 
a part of the nati onal government as any group could possibly be. 
As such, they are not minority groups fi ghti ng for politi cal power. 
That central governments in Africa are not threatened politi cally 
may explain why they have readily acknowledged in legislati on the 
enti tlement of traditi onal groups to their folklore.550
Benedict Kingsbury also found the concept of ‘indigenous people’ so-
mewhat problemati c in Southeast Asia, due partly to its colonial history.551
Conservati on
The objecti ve to conserve intangible cultural heritage is quite diff er-
ent from some of the other underlying objecti ves discussed in this arti cle. This 
objecti ve benefi ts not only traditi onal communiti es and developing countries, 
but also nontraditi onal communiti es and developed countries. Preservati on 
and conservati on, indeed, provide the main objecti ves of the protecti on for 
cultural arti facts. As John Merryman noted:
The essenti al ingredient of any cultural property policy is that the 
object itself be physically preserved. The point is too obvious to 
need elaborati on; if it is lost or destroyed, the Etruscan sarcopha-
gus or the Peruvian texti le or the Chinese pot cannot be studied, 
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enjoyed, or used. Everything else depends on the physical survival 
of the cultural arti fact itself. Indeed, from a certain point of view 
the observati on is tautological; if we don’t care about its preserva-
ti on, it isn’t, for us, a cultural object. 552
Thus, many consider cultural arti facts as ‘survivors’.553 As such, they 
‘play[] an integral role in characterizing and expressing the shared identi ty and 
essence of a community, a people and a nati on. Cultural property tells people 
who they are and where they come from.’554 Diff erent people have diff erent 
ways to ‘live[] their lives and order[] their values. [Because e]very human so-
ciety manages to place its unique stamp on its arti facts … [cultural arti facts] 
reveal something essenti al about itself.’555
Like the protecti on of cultural arti facts, conservati on is a very import-
ant objecti ve of the protecti on for intangible cultural heritage. Unlike the pro-
tecti on of tangible objects, however, the conservati on of such heritage focus-
es mainly on the materials—whether they are physical, cultural or biological. 
Such conservati on does not focus on cultures themselves. As Professor Mezey 
reminded us, ‘we humans should save species not because of the interest 
each species has in its own survival, but for the sake of diversity and the con-
tributi on of each species to a diversifi ed global ecosystem’.556
Commentators have expressed concern about the ecological impact 
of increased intellectual property protecti on. As one commentator noted, 
one of the key ecological impacts of the TRIPS Agreement is ‘the spread of 
monocultures as corporati ons with [intellectual property rights] att empt to 
maximize returns on investments by increasing market shares’.557 To highlight 
the danger of a lack of biodiversity, commentators have retold stories about 
‘the Irish potato famine during the 1840s and the Southern Corn Leaf Blight 
during the 1970s’.558 Jack Kloppenburg also pointed out that ‘none of the 
world’s twenty most important food crops is indigenous to North America or 
Australia … [and that] it is clearly the West Central Asiati c and Lati n American 
regions whose germplasm resources have historically made the largest genet-
552 John Henry Merryman, ‘The Public Interest in Cultural Property’ (1989) 77 California L Rev 
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ic contributi on to feeding the world’. 559
To date, the developing South possesses far richer biodiversity than 
the developed North. As Chidi Oguamanam observed:
The richness of biodiversity in the tropical South can be captured 
from few samples. A single leguminous tree in Peru harbours forty-
three species of ants, almost the same as the enti re ant populati on 
in Great Britain. Costa Rica has an esti mated fi ft een hundred to two 
thousand butt erfl y species. Britain has about sixty, even though 
Costa Rica consti tutes less than one-sixth of the Briti sh land area. 
To physical/zoological geographers and conservati on biologists, 
the whole of Europe is but a small fragment compared to Asia in 
terms of diversity of animal life. All the tree species in North Ame-
rica are equal to just seven hundred species of trees in ten selected 
one-hectare plots in Borneo. The Cape Florist Peninsula in South 
Africa, which is only 470 square kilometres in area, is home to over 
two thousand indigenous species, a greater number than the enti re 
fl ora species of Eastern North America. A square-kilometre of the 
forests of Central or South America contains a legendary collecti on 
running into hundreds of assorted species.560
Sadly, the internati onal system operates in the opposite directi on: the 
wealth of a country is usually inversely proporti onal to the richness of its bio-
diversity. Because the market off ers limited value to traditi onal materials and 
biological resources, the South was unable to convert their biological wealth 
to economic development. To add insult to the injury, the biodiversity-poor 
countries ‘are now exporti ng wheat, corn, and rice to the very nati ons in which 
those crops originated’—at high prices at ti mes.561 In view of this inequitable 
arrangement, developing countries are now demanding reform that refl ects 
their contributi ons and takes account of their local conditi ons.562 They also 
seek greater fi nancial resources from developed countries to help conserve 
biological resources.
Fortunately, as Paul Heald suggested, conservati on of natural resourc-
es may provide common ground for developed and developing countries, tra-
diti onal and nontraditi onal communiti es, and corporati ons and individuals to 
work together. As he explained, ‘preservati on is in the direct fi nancial interest 
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of some of the most powerful private insti tuti ons on the earth—internati onal 
pharmaceuti cal, agribusiness and bio-tech fi rms—and it is worth convincing 
them to support the eff ort’.563 Indeed, conservati on would help create ‘ethnic 
externaliti es’ that may benefi t the enti re world—both in the cultural and bio-
logical sense. 564
While conservati on benefi ts all humanity, including both traditi onal 
and nontraditi onal communiti es, conservati on provides additi onal benefi ts to 
traditi onal communiti es. In some cases, conservati on may even be needed to 
enable these communiti es to survive. As the IPR Commission declared in the 
public health context:
Traditi onal knowledge is essenti al to the … health of millions of pe-
ople in the developing world. In many countries, traditi onal medici-
nes provide the only aff ordable treatment available to poor people. 
In developing countries, up to 80% of the populati on depend on 
traditi onal medicines to help meet their healthcare needs. In ad-
diti on, knowledge of the healing properti es of plants has been the 
source of many modern medicines.565
According to Professor Coombe, ‘most of the worlds’ poorest peo-
ple depend upon their traditi onal environmental, agricultural, and medici-
nal knowledge for their conti nuing survival, given their marginalizati on from 
market economies and the inability of markets to meet their basic needs of 
social reproducti on’.566
Access
An objecti ve that is oft en menti oned along with conservati on is ac-
cess. Access is important to scienti fi c research. The need for access by the 
scienti fi c and museum communiti es, however, has created signifi cant tension 
with the interests of traditi onal communiti es. A notable example concerns the 
discovery of what traditi onal communiti es have called the ‘Ancient One’, but 
what the popular press and many commentators have dubbed the ‘Kennewick 
Man’—a label derived from Kennewick, Washington, the town near which the 
skeleton was found.567 As Professor Harding described:
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In the summer of 1996, two men came across the remains of a hu-
man skeleton lying in the Columbia River. Aft er a brief investi gati on, 
a group of anthropologists made two tentati ve fi ndings. First, the 
skeletal remains were that of a Caucasian and could not be assig-
ned to any Nati ve American tribe living in the area. Second, the 
skeletal remains were approximately 9000 years old. The age and 
locati on of the remains led the Army Corps of Engineers to assume 
they were associated with local Nati ve American tribes and to send 
out a noti ce of intent to repatriate the remains in accordance with 
NAGPRA [Nati ve American Graves Protecti on and Repatriati on Act 
of 1990]. Numerous tribes in the area subsequently laid claim to the 
remains, now known as the Kennewick Man, named aft er the town 
near where he was discovered. At least two of the tribes claiming 
the remains, the Umati lla and the Nez Perce, announced that they 
would not permit scienti fi c research on the remains prior to rebu-
rial. Shortly aft er the publicati on of the noti ce of intent and before 
actual repatriati on, a group of scienti sts fi led suit in federal district 
court claiming, among other things, the right to perform tests on 
the remains to determine whether the skeleton is Nati ve American 
within the meaning of NAGPRA. The scienti sts were subsequently 
joined in their lawsuit by the Asatru Folk Assembly, a pre-Christi an, 
European religion, which sought custody of the remains on the ba-
sis of the alleged European descent of the remains for the purpose 
of scienti fi c study and reburial in accordance with their religious 
beliefs.568
Aft er eight years, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit fi nally 
decided that the approximately 9,000-year-old remains did not fall within the 
scope of NAGPRA.569 Because the remains were not culturally affi  liated with 
any legiti mate claimant, the court did not order the remains to be repatriated 
and permitt ed scienti fi c research on the skeleton.
While scienti sts and archaeologists tend to place higher values on 
research and discoveries than cultural privacy and respect,570 it is hard to 
ignore the fact that these value-laden decisions tend to privilege the nontradi-
ti onal worldview over the traditi onal one. As Rebecca Tsosie pointed out, ‘The 
complex world views [to which traditi onal communiti es subscribe] … encom-
pass radically diff erent noti ons of life, death, kinship and cultural conti nuity, 
and suggest that the scienti fi c proof standard is a complete mismatch for Nati -
131–33; Gerstenblith (n 499 above) 163–67; S Alan Ray, ‘Nati ve American Identi ty and the Challenge of 
Kennewick Man’ (2006) 79 Temple L Rev 89.
568 Harding (n 473 above) 349.
569 Bonnichsen v United States, 367 F.3d 864, 882 (9th Cir 2004).
























ve American claims to ancient remains. Science is incapable of demonstrati ng 
what Kennewick Man’s “culture” was.’571 It is therefore no surprise that the 
Internati onal Society of Ethnobiology stated as one of its guiding principles 
that scienti sts and researchers should have a duty ‘to ensure that their re-
search and acti viti es have minimum impact on local communiti es’.572 Aft er 
all, the controversy surrounding the Ancient One, or the Kennewick Man, is 
one ‘about whether the self-defi niti on of a Nati ve American group should be 
recognized even when it confl icts with the scienti fi c interests of the dominant 
cultural and politi cal group in the United States’.573
The reburial of human remains of indigenous peoples, indeed, has 
sparked signifi cant controversies and concerns among the indigenous, scien-
ti fi c and museum communiti es.574 It has also raised questi ons about whether 
indigenous peoples should be treated diff erently. With the assistance provid-
ed by the NAGPRA, indigenous communiti es have begun to insist on the re-
turn of all the human remains that are sti ll housed in museums or research 
insti tuti ons.575 As one commentator noted, ‘most of the tribes believe that if 
you rob the dead … it disturbs the spirit and visits harm upon not only those 
who disturbed the grave, but on the relati ves of the dead, who allowed that 
to happen’.576 Likewise, Professor Harding reminded us that ‘the Kumeyaay 
believe that if the remains of an ancestor are disturbed, the spirit returns from 
the aft erworld and remains in pain unti l the remains are again returned to 
the earth’.577 By contrast, many museums believe that the retenti on of the 
remains is needed both for research purposes and for meeti ng their patrons’ 
general expectati on of authenti city.578 Scienti sts, understandably, also place 
high values on research, which they claim will benefi t all humanity, including 
both traditi onal and nontraditi onal communiti es.579
Another example that illustrates well the tension between access 
571 Rebecca Tsosie, ‘Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and Contemporary Cultural 
Values’ (1999) 31 Arizona State LJ 583, 640.
572 Posey (n 474 above) 214.
573 Gerstenblith (n 499 above) 178.
574 On the eff ort by a young Inuit man and his tribe to rebury the human remains of his father displayed 
in the American Museum of Natural History in New York, see Kenn Harper, Give Me My Father’s Body: The 
Life of Minik the New York Eskimo (Steerforth Press 2000).
575 Gerstenblith (n 499 above) 162–63.
576 Vicki Quade, ‘Who Owns the Past?: How Nati ve American Indian Lawyers Fight for Their Ancestors’ 
Remains and Memories’ (Winter 1989–1990) Human Rights 24, 29.
577 Harding (n 562 above) 765.
578 Gerstenblith (n 499 above) 162–63.
579 Merryman (n 550 above) 359.
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and control concerns the potenti ally destructi ve practi ces of some traditi onal 
communiti es—such as the Zunis’ treatment of their Ahayu:da and the Igbo 
people’s neglect of their mbaris. Ahayu:da, the Zuni War Gods, ‘are carved 
wooden fi gures which are left  in specifi c places in the mountains for ritual 
purposes’.580 As Professor Harding noted, ‘the most respectf ul treatment [of 
these War Gods may be] destructi on or neglect’.581 Removing them is there-
fore not only considered theft  and sacrilege, but may rob the War Gods of 
their powers.582 Putti  ng these statues in a museum also would deeply disturb 
the Zunis, and perhaps other traditi onal communiti es, creati ng cultural dis-
comfort, psychological distress and even spiritual harm. As Professor Harding 
explained:
Violati ng the wishes and needs of Nati ve American tribes with res-
pect to their cultural property neither helps the non-Indian popu-
lati on understand Indian cultures nor assists in creati ng a sense of 
connecti on. This noti on of a common heritage [as embraced by 
many museums] is at best an amorphous idea and at its worst an ex-
cuse to impose a museum-going culture on an oft en not-so-recepti -
ve Indian populati on. It is more oft en than not an easy excuse to put 
our own Western educati onal, scienti fi c, and arti sti c demands over 
and above the interests and integrity of another culture.… Our com-
mon heritage is, if anything, our ability to appreciate the beauty 
and integrity of another culture and so it should be with an eye on 
preserving cultural integrity that we go about understanding and 
dealing with cultural property.583
Equally problemati c is the seemingly counterintuiti ve practi ce of the 
Igbo people in Nigeria: they developed artf ully created structures but ignored, 
and someti mes destroyed, them aft er completi ng their creati ons. Many con-
servati onists are likely to fi nd their practi ce shocking, partly because of the 
aestheti c appeal of the mbaris and partly because of the wasteful nature of 
the Igbo practi ce. Some well-intenti oned ones may even off er to ‘rescue’ and 
‘protect’ these mbaris—perhaps by relocati ng them to a museum for public 
display. However, as Professor Harding explained:
Indigenous peoples … tend to place greater emphasis on intangi-
bles and process.… The Igbo intenti onally destroy or neglect their 
artf ully created structures to ensure the vitality of the urge to re-
create: ‘The purposeful neglect of the painstakingly and devoutly 
580 Harding (n 562 above) 746 fn. 118.
581 ibid 771.
























accomplished mbari houses with all their art objects in them as 
soon as the primary mandate of their creati on has been served, 
provides a signifi cant insight into the Igbo aestheti c value as process 
rather than product. Process is moti on while product is rest. When 
the product is preserved or venerated, the impulse to repeat the 
process is compromised.’584
Indeed, their practi ce is quite diff erent from the approach taken by 
nontraditi onal communiti es, which have a tendency to collect, or even hoard, 
cultural objects. As Professor Harding explained further:
Collecti ng nati ons choose to reify the objects themselves, placing 
them in hermeti cally sealed display cases, whereas in many instan-
ces, source nati ons and indigenous peoples desire to preserve the 
spirit of the object over the object itself. Oft en the destructi on, ne-
glect, or seclusion of the object is, in fact, central to the preserva-
ti on of the spirit, as is the case with the mbari house of the Igbo and 
the Zuni War Gods.585
Finally, commentators have expressed concern that greater protec-
ti on—in the form of property rights, perhaps—would reduce access to tra-
diti onal materials. Such concerns are unlikely to be justi fi ed, except in cases 
where the protecti ve regime includes in situ protecti on that restricts access of 
the communiti es to a plant or a site. As Dennis Karjala noted:
The patent may … mean that the price everywhere is higher than 
it would be were the product available without patent protecti on. 
It remains a fair questi on, however, whether the improved product 
would exist at all but for the patent incenti ve. We must bear in mind 
that no one is forced to buy the new product. Everyone is free to 
conti nue using whatever he or she has used in the past. Those who 
do choose to buy patented seed, for example, presumably believe 
that the higher seed cost is more than compensated by the benefi -
cial improvements brought about by the newer product.586
Although Professor Karjala focused on patents, his arguments apply 
equally well to other forms of intellectual property or sui generis rights. As he 
concluded, ‘The harmful infl uences of western life style for indigenous cul-
tures are serious and real. Unfortunately, they will not be ameliorated by what 
would inevitably be minor adjustments to patent law in western countries or 
584 Harding (n 473 above) 309–10.
585 ibid 312.




in locales of traditi onal cultures.’587
Theory, however, someti mes diff ers from practi ce. For instance, the 
issued patents and plant variety protecti on certi fi cates may be overbroad and 
therefore may cover TK that should be considered unprotectable prior art. In 
the United States and other developed countries, there have been wide and 
intense discussions about the poor quality of the patent examinati on process. 
There have also been successful challenges by traditi onal communiti es and 
indigenous groups to patents that have been wrongfully issued to preexisti ng 
TK.588 Indeed, because of a lack of documentati on for TK and the diffi  culty 
in determining whether an inventi on has used such pre-existi ng knowledge, 
commentators have proposed to introduce a disclosure requirement in the 
patent applicati on procedure.
By expanding rights and protecti ng them aggressively, the intellectual 
property system someti mes may also lead to unintended consequences that 
can aff ect the ability by traditi onal communiti es to exploit their knowledge 
and practi ces. For example, commentators have noted the confusion among 
US customs offi  cials over whether it is legal for Mexican farmers to import into 
the United States naturally grown yellow beans that have been nati ve to Mexi-
co since perhaps the ti me of the Aztecs.589 Such confusion, which has resulted 
in signifi cantly reduced bean exports from Mexico to the United States,590 was 
caused by the issuance of a patent and plant variety protecti on certi fi cate to 
the Enola variety of yellow beans that originated from Mexico.
To be certain, it is diffi  cult to disti nguish between the patented beans 
and the naturally grown variety. It is also worth pointi ng out that the patent 
in the Enola beans has since been revoked.591 Thus, technically, it is not the 
protecti ve regime per se that caused the problem, but rather the failed or 
improper implementati on of that regime. However, from the standpoint of 
traditi onal communiti es, this type of situati on would not have occurred had 
intellectual property rights not been aggressively protected in the fi rst place. 
To them, the abuse was an inevitable result of the conti nuous and ill-advised 
expansion and overzealous enforcement of intellectual property rights.
587 ibid 1442.
588 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (n 462 above) 75–79.
589 Finger (n 493 above) 23–24.
590 Gillian N Ratt ray, ‘The Enola Bean Patent Controversy: Biopiracy, Novelty and Fish-and-Chips’ [2002] 
Duke L & Technology Rev 0008.
591 ETC Group, ‘Hollow Victory: Enola Bean Patent Smashed at Last (Maybe)’ (30 April 2008) <htt p://www.
























Commentators have widely documented the growing problems of bi-
opiracy and the conti nuous push for stronger intellectual property protecti on, 
which ranges from heightened protecti on through the TRIPS Agreement to 
additi onal safeguards through the recently established bilateral and regional 
agreements. As a result, traditi onal communiti es and developing countries are 
eager to use the protecti on of intangible cultural heritage to fi ght back. As 
Antony Taubman noted, ‘in practi ce, the impulse towards strengthened pro-
tecti on of TK originates from a sense that [intellectual property] rights have 
been used to misappropriate material that might otherwise have fallen into 
the public domain’.592
Although traditi onal communiti es and developing countries under-
stand the need to reduce biopiracy and the conti nued pressure to expand 
intellectual property rights, some of them may not have any overarching ob-
jecti ves other than to resist the conti nuing push for stronger protecti on by 
nontraditi onal communiti es and developed countries. As Professor Harding 
observed, ‘at least one individual has expressed a senti ment about repatria-
ti on that is likely common among Nati ve Americans: “Our dream is to pull a 
U-Haul up and take back as much as we can.”’593 This comment captured very 
well the fi ght-back mentality of many traditi onal communiti es and developing 
countries. To them, the new internati onal framework for the protecti on of 
intangible cultural heritage is not just a shield to protect themselves, but also 
a sword to enable them to recapture what they have lost under the current 
unfair system.594
To be certain, the wide use of resistance is likely to sti fl e internati on-
al cooperati on and result in greater isolati on. However, it is understandable 
why these communiti es want to fi ght back through resistance—as compared 
to, say, cooperati on. There has been growing mistrust between developed 
and developing countries as well as between traditi onal and nontraditi onal 
communiti es about the willingness and ability of the current legal regime to 
protect intangible cultural heritage.
Moreover, the push for stronger protecti on for intangible cultural 
heritage would provide the needed ‘bargaining chips’ to ward off  the push by 
592 Taubman (n 520 above) 543.
593 Harding (n 530 above) 515.
594 Dutf ield (n 507 above) 496; WIPO (n 469 above) 13.
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developed countries for stronger intellectual property protecti on. As Robert 
Sherwood recounted his exchange with a Brazilian diplomat:
I recall the diplomat in Buenos Aires who said in a public forum that 
Argenti na must withhold the intellectual property chip because 
Argenti na has few others to play into the internati onal trade ne-
goti ati ons game. He speaks for many other developing country tra-
de negoti ators. I later suggested to him, privately, that more might 
be achieved for the Argenti ne trade account if robust intellectual 
property were installed immediately. The result could well be that 
more Argenti ne producers and farmers would upgrade their pro-
ducts, crops and animals and become more competi ti ve interna-
ti onally. Instead, if they wait for eventual trade negoti ati on success, 
they might lower a European tariff  a few notches, if that, but the 
gain would be narrow and selecti ve, rather than sweeping across 
the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy. He readily 
agreed, but insisted that the chip must be withheld to give his cou-
ntry something with which to bargain.595
This encounter shows that developing countries may not necessarily 
want to request protecti on in those areas, but they choose to do so because 
they fear that they would not have any bargaining chips left  for future negoti a-
ti ons. The same can be said of traditi onal communiti es. Like many developing 
countries, these communiti es remain frustrated by the existi ng system, and 
some of them have become increasingly desperate. As Suzan Harjo, the for-
mer head of the Nati onal Congress of American Indians, put it poignantly, ‘[T]
hey have stolen our land, water, our dead relati ves, the stuff  we are buried 
with, our culture, even our shoes. There’s litt le left  that’s tangible. Now they’re 
taking what’s intangible.’596
CONCLUSION
The stakeholders in the debate on intangible cultural heritage want 
to achieve many diff erent objecti ves. A deeper understanding of these objec-
ti ves would certainly help us bett er appreciate the stakes involved in the de-
bate and the rich variety of proposals advanced by the relevant stakeholders. 
Such an understanding would provide important clues on how to design a new 
framework to protect intangible cultural heritage. It would also provide im-
portant informati on about the various competi ng interests among indigenous 
peoples and within traditi onal communiti es as well as the potenti al challenges 
595 Robert M Sherwood, ‘Some Things Cannot Be Legislated’ (2002) 10 Cardozo J Intl & Comparati ve L 37, 
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to achieving international consensus on the protection of these interests.
In reviewing the eight underlying objectives discussed in this article, it 
is important to recognize that these objectives are not always mutually exclu-
sive, and advocates of strong protection for intangible cultural heritage often 
combine different objectives to craft their proposals. Nevertheless, some of 
these objectives may overlap or conflict with each other, while the others may 
affect only a minority of the stakeholders. Thus, a better and deeper unders-
tanding of these objectives would help us anticipate the political dynamics 
surrounding the negotiations in this emerging area.
In the near future, achieving consensus is likely to remain a challenge. 
If the new international framework for the protection of intangible cultural he-
ritage is defined too narrowly—with an exclusive focus on selected objectives, 
perhaps—this framework is unlikely to have enough buy-in from the non-be-
neficiaries. This is not uncommon in conventions that seek to protect cultural 
heritage: one only has to consider the membership of the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, which is made up of mostly 
source nations.597
However, if the framework is defined too broadly—to the point that 
it encompasses all the different objectives, or at least most of them—the 
framework’s vague and aspirational language may ultimately undermine its 
effectiveness. A case in point is the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protec-
tion and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. This convention 
is more ‘aspirational ... than obligatory’, and its drafters seemed to be more 
interested in providing a platform for nurturing a long-term dialogue than 
achieving short-term results.598
It took more than 13 years to finalize the Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples. Similarly, despite meeting for close to a decade and 
a half, the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore only began recently to 
submit draft treaty texts to the WIPO General Assembly for consideration. It is 
therefore likely to take some time before a new international framework can 
be established to offer concrete protection to intangible cultural heritage. As 
new players and issues emerge, the policy debate in this area will likely beco-
me even more complex.
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